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EXPANDING SCOPE OF BANKRUPTCY LAWS
Section VIII, Clause 4 of Article I of the Constitution of the
United States vests in the Congress power to "establish . . . uni-
form Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States". Section X, Clause i of Article I prohibits a state from pass-
ing any "Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts". By these two
clauses, the authors of the Constitution intended that power to alter
contract rights of creditors should be vested solely in Congress, and
when exercised, should operate uniformly throughout the nation. A
state may not pass an insolvency or bankruptcy law that is inconsis-
tent with an existing national uniform Act, or that impairs existing
contracts.'
Federal courts have frequently construed the phrase, "laws on the
subject of bankruptcies". They have approved the definition given by
Story in his work on Constitutional Law-a bankruptcy law is a law
making provision for persons failing to pay their debts.2 They have
said that the constitutional phrase includes all Acts dealing with the
relation between an insolvent or non-paying debtor and his creditors,
extending to his or their relief.3 In its narrowest sense, the phrase
includes laws which provide for the distribution of a debtor's property
among his creditors; in its broadest sense, laws for the discharge of a
debtor from liability on his provable debts,4 with some exceptions. 5
The scope of this power granted to Congress is not restricted by tra-
ditional concepts derived from English law, nor by the earlier Ameri-
can Acts, so long as the requirements of due process are observed. The
limits of the power can be determined only by the gradual process of
inclusion and exclusion. 6
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It is not surprising, therefore, to find that to each succeeding
national Bankruptcy Act there have been added what the Court calls
"liberalizing" provisions, and that later Acts, and amendments to them,
have extended relief to persons and corporations not included within
the scope of earlier ones.
The first national Bankruptcy Act, enacted in i8oo, in the main,
embodied the existing Bankruptcy Law of England, and applied to
merchants, bankers, brokers, factors, underwriters and traders only.
It was repealed in 18o3 by the Jeffersonians, because of their opposi-
tion to aggregating power in the national government, after which
there was no federal statute relating to bankruptcies until 1841. The
Act of that year was applicable to the estates of all living persons (ex-
cept those under guardianship) and to various kinds of corporations.
For the first time, a debtor was permitted voluntarily to bring his estate
into court for distribution. Like the former Act, this one was repealed
within a few years. A third bankruptcy statute was passed in 1867.
Its definition of bankruptcy was such that a debtor could be thrown
into involuntary bankruptcy whenever he was unable to meet his obli-
gations as they matured, but it embodied a new idea, borrowed from
English law. A debtor might propose a composition that would
become binding on all creditors after it had been accepted by a desig-
nated majority of creditors and approved by the court. That Act was
repealed in 1878. The present law was passed in 1898. As originally
enacted, it applied to all natural persons, except wage earners, farmers,
and unincorporated associations, and to all corporations engaged prin-
cipally in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing or mercantile
pursuits. Railroads, incorporated banks and insurance companies were
expressly excluded. But in i9io, the Act was amended so as to include
"any moneyed business or commercial corporation except municipal,
railroad, insurance or banking corporations". For the first time,
municipal corporations were mentioned, only to be expressly excluded.
Railroad, insurance and banking corporations were excluded because
administration of them, when insolvent, was in the hands of state
officials, or, as in the case of railroads, in Federal Courts of Equity.
There have been numerous other amendments, most notable of which
are Sections 77 and 77 B authorizing reorganization of railroads and
other corporations, and the Frazier-Lemke Amendment relating to
farmers. But the limits of the power had not even then been reached.
BACKGROUND FOR EXTENSION TO MUNICIPAL DEBTS
It is rather significant that municipal corporations were expressly
excluded from the i9io Act, since numerous municipalities and coun-
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ties had been in financial difficulty between 187o and 189o. Most of
them were in the Middle West. Most of the defaults occurred on
bonds that had been issued to aid in the construction of railroads;
others resulted from extravagance in the construction of municipal
improvements, while some were due to special misfortunes. But in
the litigation that ensued, illegality of issue was usually given as the
excuse for non-payment. More than 200 cases involving the validity
of municipal bonds were decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States during the term of office of Chief Justice Waite alone. In the
great majority of these cases, the bonds were held valid,- and settle-
ments were voluntarily effected between creditors and debtors. In
these settlements, reductions were, as a rule, made only in 'interest
accrued, or to accrue, or both, rather than by scaling down the prin-
cipal; but in some instances, it was found necessary to scale principal
as well as interest. St. Clair County (Mo.), for example, which had
issued $2oo,ooo principal of bonds, remained in default for over 4o
years. At the time of settlement with its creditors, the principal and
interest past due amounted to over $9ooooo. This was compromised
for 40 per cent. of the total. As a result of these settlements, municipal
bonds regained their reputation and continued to be regarded as sound
investments. After the World War, the market for them was widely
extended and the volume of municipal bonds outstanding steadily
increased.
The collapse of the Florida boom in 1928 initiated another period
of defaults, but even prior to that, defaults had occurred in the bonds
of drainage and irrigation districts, both in Florida and in the West.
During the Florida real estate boom, millions of dollars of bonds were
issued by counties to finance the construction of roads, since the Con-
stitution prohibited the state from issuing bonds. Most Florida
municipal bonds had been issued for the construction of streets, but
unlimited extravagance prevailed in the construction of all types of
municipal improvements. After the market crash of 1929, defaults
began to occur in other states, notably in North Carolina, Texas,
Arkansas and California; even in New Jersey, and in Massachusetts
whose municipal debt record is probably the best of any state in the
Union. The great cities of Detroit and Chicago were on the verge of
financial collapse. It is said that in 1934, there were 2,oI9 munici-
palities, counties and other governmental units in default on principal
or interest, or both, and that the total principal of securities involved
was in excess of $i,ooo,ooo,ooo.
It was under these circumstances that the suggestion was made
that relief for defaulting public corporations and political subdivisions
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and their creditors could be provided by Congress under its bank-
ruptcy power. A bill embodying this idea was introduced by Senator
Duncan U. Fletcher of Florida in 1933; but that Congress adjourned
without taking any action on the bill. At the beginning of the next
session, Representative J. Mark Wilcox, a newly elected member of
the House of Representatives, at that time attorney for West Palm
Beach, a city then hopelessly in default, introduced HR 5884, which
after some changes and modifications became Section 303, Title XI,
U. S. C. A.-Section 8o of the Bankruptcy Law. The bill received
the support not only of representatives of defaulting communities,
but also of many investment houses, and of the Administration. It
appeared to furnish the only solution for a problem of national
importance.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FIRST ACT
Constitutionality of the Act was soon challenged in a case arising
in Texas. The District Court held the Act unconstitutional; 7 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed." The Supreme Court of the
United States by a divided court affirmed the decision of the District
Court.9 The majority opinion was by Justice McReynolds, that of the
minority by Justice Cardozo. The majority held that under the Ameri-
can system of dual sovereignty, Congress has no power to interfere
with a state's control over its own subdivisions, counties, municipali-
ties, etc. The opinion did not indicate what particular provisions of
the Act would interfere with the states' control; rather its conclusion
seems to have been due to a fear of the consequences that might fol-
low a decision that the Act was valid. This appears from the sugges-
tion that Congress, in that event, might even provide for bankruptcy
of states, and is particularly apparent in its statement that
"Our special concern is with the existence of the power claimed-
not merely the immediate outcome of what has already been
attempted. And it is of first importance that due attention be
given to the results which might be brought about by the exercise
of such a power in the future." -1
Because of the generality of the opinion, it was doubted whether
any Act of similar import would be held constitutional. But the situa-
tion was so serious, and defaults were so widespread, that proponents
7. In re Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 9 F. Supp. 1O3 (S. D.
Tex. 1934).
1 8. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. i v. Ashton et al., 81 F. (2d)
9o5 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
9. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U. S. 513
(1936).
io. Id. at 53o.
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of the plan determined to make another attempt to draft a valid statute.
Representative Wilcox called a conference of persons interested, to
consider what, if anything, could be done. After a closer study of the
majority opinion, the conference concluded that an act could be drafted
that would furnish the much needed relief, and that would not conflict
with the principle of the decision. That conclusion was not a hasty
one, but rested upon other decisions of the Supreme Court, and upon
deductions therefrom.
Both majority and minority opinions in the Ashton case assumed
that the 1934 Act was within the meaning of the constitutional phrase,
"a uniform law on the subject of bankruptcies". That assumption
logically followed approval of Justice Story's definition of bankruptcy,
and the decisions in the Rei'nan11 and Klein 2 cases. Hence, invalid-
ity of the 1934 Act was due solely to the fact that it was in conflict
with the sovereign powers of states, and not because it was not a law
on the subject of bankruptcies.
Clearly, Congress could not authorize institution of an involun-
tary proceeding in bankruptcy against a municipality, because such a
proceeding would necessarily be an interference with the state's con-
trol of its local subdivisions. It was, therefore, essential to the validity
of any municipal bankruptcy Act that it should authorize voluntary
proceedings only. It was even doubted that a voluntary proceeding
could be instituted unless a state should authorize its subdivisions to
avail themselves of the benefits of the statute. Congress has no power
to confer authority upon state officials. Congress can provide a
machinery which they can use if the state gives authority. The state
itself cannot provide procedure in bankruptcy, since it is expressly pro-
hibited from impairing the obligations of creditors, but it can authorize
its subdivisions to avail themselves of such procedure as Congress may
provide without usurping the state's powers.13
The fact that earlier English and American Bankruptcy statutes
did not authorize municipal corporations to invoke bankruptcy, did not
militate against the power of Congress to authorize such procedure.
The Rock Island 14 and Louisville Bank 15 cases had pointed to the fact
that bankruptcy had been repeatedly liberalized and broadened, and that
the limits of Congressional power had not been exceeded thereby.
Nor did the fact that a municipal corporation could not be adjudi-
cated a bankrupt and its property sold and distributed among its credi-
ii. In re Reiman, 20 Fed. Cas. 490, No. 11,673 (S. D. N. Y. 1874).
12. In re Klein, 14, Fed. Cas. 716, No. 7,865 (D. Mo. 1843).
13. Guardian Say. & Trust Co. v. Rd. Imp. Dist. No. 7, 276 U. S. i (1925).
14. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bk. & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry.
Co., 294 U. S. 648 (i935).
15. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935).
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tors, create an obstacle that inhibited Congress from authorizing such
a corporation to propose a composition. An adjudication in bank-
ruptcy is not a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of a Court of Bank-
ruptcy to entertain and confirm a composition voluntarily proposed.16
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that Section 77 B,
providing for the reorganization of private corporations, did not vio-
late the Fifth Amendment, even though the statute authorized approval
of a plan that would modify or alter secured debts. The court said
that the Act was not so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be incom-
patible with fundamental law. 17  The Supreme Court of the United
States denied certiorari.'
8
The Supreme Court of the United States not only had defined
compositions, but it had enumerated the essential characteristics of
them. A composition, it had said, was in the nature of a contract or
agreement between the debtor and a majority of its creditors. In a
proceeding for composition, the Court is limited to a determination of
the fairness of that agreement; but for this it would not be necessary
for the debtor to seek the intervention of the Court. A composition,
in some respects, supersedes and is outside of bankruptcy; 19 it is, in
effect, nothing more than a means for securing the pro rata payment
to creditors of a substantial equivalent of the value of the debtor's.
property, leaving the debtor in possession of its property during the
pendency of the proceeding; 20 when a composition has been confirmed
by the Court, jurisdiction over the debtor terminates, 21 and the debtor
is discharged from his former debts.
It was, therefore, assumed that if the right of a municipality to
proceed in bankruptcy should be contingent upon authority from its
state to file a voluntary proceeding, and if the statute should provide
for a composition only, proposed by the debtor and accepted by a des-
ignated majority of its creditors, the debtor would ipso facto retain its
freedom of action and possession of its property; and upon confirma-
tion of the composition, the Court's jurisdiction over the debtor would
terminate, and the petitioner would be discharged from its existing
debts. Such an act could not interfere with or abridge the power of the
state over its municipalities and political or governmental subdivisions.
16. It re Reiman, 20 Fed. Cas. 49o, No. 11,673 (S. D. N. Y. x874).
17. Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
z8. 296 U. S. 581 ('935).
ig. Nassau Smelting & Refining Works, Ltd. v. Brightwood Bronze Foundry Co.,
265 U. S. 269, 271 (924).
20. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. DeWitt, 237 U. S. 447 (915); Iu re Lane,
125 Fed. 772 SD. Mass. I9o2). But cf. 52 STAT. 909 (,938), ii U. S. C. A. §§738,
742, 743 (1939).
21. Guaranty Trust Co. v. McCabe, 25o Fed. 699 (C. C. A. 2d, I918), cert. dened,
247 U. S. 505 (1918). But cf. 52 STAT. 912 (1938), 1i U. S. C. A. §§ 768, 769 (1939).
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECOND ACT
Proceeding upon these premises, a Bill was drawn, introduced by
Representative Wilcox, and passed. It is now Section 403, Title XI,
U. S. C. A. In order that the Bill should be consistent with legal
theories, certain changes were made from old Section 303, Title XI
(Sec. 8o of the Bankruptcy Act) which had been held void.
The former Act provided for a "Plan of Adjustment", or Reor-
ganization. The present Act provides for the confirmation of a "Plan
of Composition". It not only terms the proposal of the debtor a com-
position, but the procedure has all the characteristics of a composition.
The use of the word "composition" could not, of course, control the
construction or validity of the statute, but the use of a well-defined
term which had legal connotations is persuasive of the purpose and
intent of the authors. What is more important, the statute utilizes
the customary procedural device of requiring consent by the holders of
a majority of the debts to be affected. Their consent must be secured
before the petition can be filed. Thus, it more nearly conforms to the
court's definition of a composition than does Section 77 or 77 B, since
the proceeding rests upon a contract between the debtor and a majority
of its creditors. In fact, it was necessary that the agreement be made
before the petition is filed, since the court could not adjudicate a
municipality bankrupt, nor sell or distribute its assets, if after the peti-
tion be filed, it should be unable to obtain consent of a majority of its
creditors.
The Act does not contain any provision for setting aside prefer-
ences, though provision is made for preventing preferences. after the
petition is filed. The court can restrain pending actions, and the insti-
tution of new ones, against the debtor. To set aside preferences, it
would have been necessary to have a trustee. The appointment of a
trustee might have been regarded as an interference with the state's
control of the debtor, and with the debtor's control of its own affairs.
It is a condition to confirmation of the composition that the debtor
be authorized by the law of the state to carry out the plan. Section 303
had required approval of the petition by an agency of the state. But
the general provision of the present act necessarily includes the provi-
sions of the former act. Recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held 21n that the right of a drainage district to file a petition is
not dependent upon state' legislative authority, but the decision rests
on the holding of the court that the officials of the district had author-
ity, impliedly given by the general statute under which the district was
created. The opinion implies that Congress can confer authority upon
2ia. Buchholz v. South Beardstown D. & L. Dist., C. C. A. 7th, Dec. 12, 1941.
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the district, but this reasoning is illogical. For if a state should pro-
hibit its subdivisions from utilizing the procedure for compostion, no
one would contend that Congress has the power to nullify that pro-
hibition. Municipal corporations are mere creatures of the state, which
can abolish them. Congress has no power to legislate authority to
them. It is the cooperation of state and nation that has made possible
the accomplishment of the desired results.
One of the most important differences between Section 303 and
Section 403 is found in subdivisions (e) and (f) of the new law. The
District Court, after hearing, enters an "Interlocutory Order". That
order is a final decision on the equities of the plan and is appealable as
in equity. But the final decree of confirmation (subdivision (f)) can-
not be entered until the consideration for the composition has been
deposited by the debtor with the court, or subject to its order. Under
the decisions of the Supreme Court, a final decree of confirmation
would terminate the Court's jurisdiction over the debtor. It was,
therefore, necessary that the consideration should be in the court's
possession at the time final decree is entered, so that nothing could
occur that might interfere with or prevent delivery by the court to each
creditor of his pro rata share of the consideration. If a final decree
of composition should be entered before consideration be deposited,
the court could not afterward compel the bankrupt to deliver to each
creditor his pro rata share of the consideration. An order to do so
would interfere with the power of the state over the debtor. Since
the consideration for a municipal composition usually consists of
bonds, it would not be possible for the court, after final decree, to com-
pel the debtor to issue them. The court cannot dispose of the assets
of the debtor, or distribute the proceeds from a sale of them as a pen-
alty for contumacious acts of the debtor. If the court has no power
to enforce its decree of confirmation, it is a nullity.
Section 3o , Title XI, U. S. C. A. (Bankruptcy Act, Section 12),
required the court to find that the plan was "for the best interests of
the creditors". The draftsmen of Section 303 (Section 8o), using
Sections 77 and 77 B as a precedent, added a requirement that the court
should also find that the plan was "fair and equitable", and "does not
discriminate either for or against any creditor". Section 403 brought
forward these additional requirements as conditions to confirmation.
The importance of these provisions became apparent when the case of
Case v. Los Angeles 22 was decided. There it was held that the phrase
"fair and equitable" is a "term of art", and that the statute imposed
upon the trial court the duty of exercising its own independent judg-
• 22. 308 U. S. io6 (1939).
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ment in determining this fact. Consent by a majority of creditors is
not alone sufficient to support a decree of confirmation. The effect of
the addition of these conditions was not fully appreciated when the
Act was drawn, but the Act as now construed furnishes additional
protection to holders of small claims.
The Report of the Committee of the House of Representatives
said that the Bill had been drawn with the "sweeping character of the
holding of the Supreme Court in the Ashton case" in mind; that it
"avoids any restriction on the powers of the States or their arms
of government in the exercise of their sovereign rights and duties.
No interference with the fiscal or governmental affairs of a subdi-
vision is permitted." 23
When the Act was attacked in the Bekins case,24 the District Judge
failed to recognize the differences between it and the former one, and
held that he was bound by the opinion in the Ashzton case to hold the
present statute unconstitutional. 25  The Supreme Court reversed that
decision. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for eight Justices, said:
"The Committee's [of Congress] points are well taken..
The statute is carefully drawn so as not to impinge upon the
sovereignty of the State. The State retains control of its fiscal
affairs." 26
He held that the Act provided for a composition, which had long been
recognized as an exercise of bankruptcy power; that no adjudication
in bankruptcy was necessary to sustain the validation of a composition
proceeding; and that the Act did not violate the Fifth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution.
The decision rests also upon the fact that "the Act is limited to
voluntary proceedings for the composition of debts". The opinion
points out that the Constitution did not prohibit cooperation between
the hation and the states through the exercise of the power of each to
the advantage of their citizens which neither nation nor state, acting
alone, could secure for them. It necessarily implies that the officials
of the debtor shall have received authority from its creator. Other-
wise there would be no cooperation.
23. H. R. REP. No. 517, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (I937) 2. (Italics supplied.)
24. In. re Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 21 F. Supp. 129 (S. D. Cal. 1937).
25. "I feel compelled by this decision to hold that the new enactment . . . is
constitutionally vulnerable as was the old. As a student, exercising private judgment,
I agree with the conclusion of the dissenters that immunity from interference through
federal bankruptcy laws, even if applicable to states, should not be extended to state
instrumentalities, whether they be municipal, quasi municipal, or public corporations.
However, as a judge of a lower court, I cannot exercise private judgment ... " Id.
at 135.
26. United States v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27, 5I (938).
MUNICIPAL DEBT ADJUSTMENTS
Four years of experience have demonstrated that the Act has not
been injurious to the rights of creditors of municipalities. On the
whole, it has been constructive and helpful. It has served two pur-
poses. Specifically, it has made it possible for municipalities, with the
consent of a majority of their creditors, to agree upon settlements of
their debts; to provide for payment of them in the future in accordance
with an orderly and feasible schedule; and has made composition settle-
ments binding upon all creditors. The possibility of confiscatory tax
levies due to large accumulated defaults has been eliminated, and
municipalities have been able to carry on ordinary governmental activi-
ties, as well as to increase in population and resources. What is equally
important, the mere fact that there was a statute of this kind that was
constitutional has caused creditors, who otherwise would seek, by inde-
pendent action, each his own advantage, to join in a serious concerted
effort to reach a fair basis of settlement. Those who otherwise might
have refused to cooperate, have accepted settlements, because they real-
ized that under the statute they could ultimately be compelled to accept
a fair and equitable plan.
Corporation bonds are usually secured by a deed of trust, with
power in the trustee, and a duty resting upon it, to act for the protec-
tion of the interests of all holders. But, municipal bonds, as a rule
have no common representative. Each holder must act for the protec-
tion of his own interest. When a default occurs on corporate bonds,
the expense of litigation is borne pro rata by all holders. Municipal
bonds do not even include a provision for attorney's fees to be added
if suit be necessary to enforce payment. Because of these facts, hold-
ers of small blocks of municipal bonds have been more or less at the
mercy of the debtor and of holders of large blocks. Under the statute
as now construed, all creditors, small as well as large, whether consent-
ing or not, receive equal protection. Their share of the consideration
for the composition is delivered to them by the court. In the Avon
Park 27 case, the Supreme Court said:
"The Court is not merely a ministerial register of the vote of
security holders. All those interested in the estate are entitled to
the Court's protection."
They do not even lose their rights by failing to prove their claim within
a given time. But for this protection, holders of a majority of bonds
might, through an agreement with the debtor, use the statute as an
instrument of oppression.
In the Avon Park case, more than two-thirds of the bondholders
had apparently consented to the proposed plan, but nearly one-half of
27. American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 309 U. S. 651 (1940).
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the bonds so consenting were owned by a dealer that was acting as
Fiscal Agent for the City. It had purchased judgments and bonds at
greatly reduced prices in order to eliminate. objections, or to obtain
consent from the required percentage. The court held that the dealer
had not made a full and complete disclosure of its interests; that its
vote for acceptance of the plan could not be said to have been cast in
good faith within the meaning of the statute. It, therefore, reversed
the lower court's approval of the plan. It pointed out the necessity for
equal treatment of all creditors. In order to do equity to all, it said,
the District Court has power "to adjust the remedy to meet the needs!'.
Such power is "not dependent on express statutory provisions. It
inheres in the jurisdiction of a Court of Bankruptcy". It suggested
various ways in which the District Judge might adjust the position of
creditors. The duties of the District Court under this Act, are, there-
fore, similar to those imposed upon it by Sections 77 and 77 B.
AMENDMENTS AND LIMITATIONS
Since its enactment, the statute has been twice amended. First,
on June 22, 1938, when subsection (j) was added. This amendment
was found necessary because of a decision by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals. A majority of creditors had voluntarily accepted refund-
ing bonds in exchange for their old securities before the petition was
filed. The Court of Appeals held that those who had voluntarily
accepted new bonds could not be counted in determining whether the
required percentage of holders had consented to the Plan of Composi-
tion.18 The amendment was later sustained by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in two cases.20 It should be noted, however, that both cases
arose upon motions to dismiss, and the Court did not determine whether
a change of circumstances, or events happening since the plan was orig-
inally proposed, would result in discrimination between creditors of the
same class or would produce inequity. The amendment is merely per-
missive. It makes it possible for a plan that has been partially carried
out before the proceeding is flied to be made binding on dissenters;
but if making the plan effective at a later date would render the plan
unfair and inequitable, or would result in discrimination for or against
creditors, or would not be for the best interests of creditors, the court
must disapprove the plan, regardless of the consents of other creditors.
Another amendment was passed June 28, 194o. It permits unin-
corporated tax or special assessment districts and counties (which were
included in the 1934 Act but omitted from the 1937 Act) to file peti-
28. In re City of West Palm Beach, 96 F. (2d) 85 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
29. American National Bank v. City of Sanford, 112 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 5th,
194o) ; Davis v. City of Homestead, 112 F. (2d) 438 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
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tions under the Act. Subsection (e) was also amended, possibly as a
result of the then pending Avon Park case. The court is now required
to examine all contracts, proposals and agreements with agents,
attorneys and others promoting the composition, particularly those
which relate to compensation, and make a separate adjudication upon
their fairness. If it finds that the contract or the practices of such
Fiscal Agent, attorney or other person or corporation promoting the
composition, do not meet with its approval, the petition must be dis-
missed, unless the parties consent to a modification of the terms of
their agreement in a manner satisfactory to the court.
The power of Congress to include counties was questioned by As-
sistant Solicitor General Weston in an opinion rendered by him at the
time the 1934 Act was before the Committee of the House. Mr. Wes-
ton was of the opinion that counties, being an integral part of a state,
could not be legally included. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
the Broward County Board of Public Instruction case3 0 held that that
Board was not a governmental body, such as a county, and affirmed the
decree of confirmation, but implied that even if the Board had been
held to be a governmental body, the decision of the Court would not
have been different. In many states, much of the revenue of counties
is derived from the state, and federal courts cannot control the distri-
bution of state funds.31 If a county's revenue is derived solely from
ad valorem taxes and no state funds are involved, and if the state has
authorized the county to file a petition, the Act may be validly applied.
But if a Plan of Composition should, in fact, produce a conflict with
the power of the state, or if the Plan of Composition should itself offer
to permit a Bankruptcy Court to interfere with the independence of
the debtor, the proceeding would conflict with the fundamental prin-
ciple of the Ashton case, which is still the law. It must be kept in mind
that though the present statute was held constitutional, that decision
was based upon the fact that it did not conflict with state and local
sovereignty. Merely because the Act is constitutional, a Federal court
may not invade the field of the state's power. The power of the Fed-
eral court under the Act is very different from that which it possesses
in proceedings instituted by individuals, or private corporations. This
limitation upon its power is necessary and applies to every step in the
proceedings. The court can make no order that will even indirectly
interfere with the sovereignty of the state, nor compel action by the
debtor. The Bekins case did not reverse the principle of constitutional
law announced in the Ashton case. It reaffirmed it.
30. Roberts v. Board of Public Instruction for Broward County, 112 F. (2d) 459
(C. C. A. sth, 1940).
31. Rittenoure v. Charlotte County, iog F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 5th, 194o).
53:2 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Some have assumed that the Interlocutory Decree may authorize
the debtor to make distribution of the new securities. The Act pro-
vides otherwise. Distribution can be made only by the court in its
final decree. Distribution made before final decree is at the risk of all
parties. If inequity or unfairness result from distribution before a
final decree of confirmation has been made, creditors who accept the
new bonds will not be protected by the Interlocutory Order.
TWILIGHT OF THE. ACT
The original Act provided that it should expire in two years, but
its life has been extended to June 30, 1942. Regardless of benefits
derived from its operation, and of the fact that, in the main, the Act
has been satisfactory, it should not become a permanent policy of our
government. The statute was the product of a condition, and was
intended to serve a limited purpose. The purpose has been substan-
tially accomplished. Unless the War should have some more or less
unexpected repercussions upon municipal bonds, the Act will not be
needed after June 30, 1942. If left on the statute book, it may become
an instrument of injustice. Community debtors may deliberately
default on their bonds in order to obtain easier terms from their credi-
tors. Bondholders often accept compromises to avoid the expense,
delay and trouble involved in legal proceedings to enforce their legal
rights, and to keep their securities current. A bankruptcy statute
should not be used to destroy or depreciate the value of contracts made
in good faith, but human nature is such, and the temptation may be so
strong, that this remedial statute could become a means for perpetrat-
ing injustice. The moral sense of obligation of a community is not
as strong as that of an individual, and loss of credit is not so detri-
mental to a municipal corporation as it is to a private corporation. The
Act should be allowed to expire. If in the future conditions should
require relief, Congress can enact a similar statute, or one better
adapted to the then existing situation. Meanwhile, precedents, legal
and practical, have been established that will furnish guideposts for
the roads that lead into the undiscovered land of the future.
